Who cares about the balderdash I spouted yesterday?
An experiment on the volatility of bargaining norms
When talking about possible bargaining results participants in the Nash bargaining game mainly use fairness norms to support their favored outcome. According to theory a variety of different, fair solutions exists from which the participants can choose. In this paper, we experimentally investigate Nash bargaining with a previous opportunity to chat about the bargaining outcome. We find that playing a dictator game prior to the Nash bargaining game establishes – without any additional communication – a fairness norm, the participants resort to. However, if nothing is played prior to the Nash bargaining game, participants discuss longer about what to play. In addition, we find that deviations in favor of one participant occur the longer preplay communication lasts.
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