Volkswagen vs. Porsche

A Power-Index Analysis

  • Roland Kirstein
Schlagworte: Banzhaf power-index, supervisory board, societas europeae, JEL: C71, D72, K22, M21

Abstract

After Porsche SE took over Volkswagen AG, its supervisory board consists of three groups: The Porsche shareholders hold 6 seats, while the 324,000 Volkswagen employees and the 12,000 Porsche employees will be represented by 3 delegates each. This paper perceives each of these three groups as unitary players and presents a power-index analysis of this supervisory board. It shows that, unless the Porsche employees are made completely powerless, Porsche and VW employees will have identical power regardless of the actual distribution of seats on the employees' side. This analysis demonstrates that the request of the Volkswagen employees (for more seats than the Porsche employees in the future supervisory board) is unfounded.

Veröffentlicht
2018-09-05
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