Are Behavioral Choices in the Ultimatum and Investment Games Strategic?

  • Lora R. Todorova
  • Bodo Vogt
Schlagworte: Coordination game, dictator game, ultimatum game, investment game, questionnaire, risk scale, risk preferences, JEL: C7, C91, D8


This paper experimentally examines the relationship between self-reporting risk preferences and behavioral choices in the subsequently played dictator, ultimatum and investment games. The results from these experiments are used to discern the motivational bases of behavioral choices in the ultimatum and investment games. The focus is on investigating whether strategic considerations are important for strategy selection in the two games. We find that self-reporting risk preferences does not alter the dictators' offers and trusters' investments, while it significantly decreases the proposers' offers and leads to a substantial decrease in the amount trustees give back to their partners. We interpret these results as evidence that the decisions of proposers in the ultimatum game and trustees in the investment game are strategic.