How Sensitive is Strategy Selection in Coordination Games?

  • Siegfried K. Berninghaus
  • Lora R. Todorova
  • Bodo Vogt
Schlagworte: Coordination game, questionnaire, risk scale, risk preferences, beliefs, focal points, framing, uncertain preferences, JEL: D81, C91, C72


This paper presents the results of an experiment designed to study the effect produced on strategy choices when a subject reports risk preferences on a risk scale before engaging in a 2x2 coordination game. The main finding is that the act of stating one's own risk preferences significantly alters strategic behavior. In particular, subjects tend to choose the risk dominant strategy more often when they have previously stated their attitudes to risk. Within a best-response correspondence framework, this result can be explained by a change in either risk preferences or beliefs. We find that self-reporting risk preferences does not induce a change in subjects' beliefs. We argue that the behavioral arguments of strategy selection, such as focal points, framing and uncertain preferences can explain our results.