Performance evaluation, efficient job assignment, and incentives
In recent years, performance measurement has become an important issue in management accounting. Several concepts which try to capture the long-term effects of management decisions have been suggested, the most popular among those the balanced scorecard. While most of the literature focuses on the decision facilitating function, some authors suggested to use the acquired information also for incentive purposes. However, critics argue that such multi-purpose use of information might have counterproductive effects. Referring to this criticism, the present paper considers a situation where performance information has to be used in a decision facilitating context in order to provide incentives in the decision influencing context. In particular, a principal has to decide whether to promote an agent to a different job or not. The incentive mechanism is renegotiation proof only if the principal benefits from the modified task allocation. Therefore, the performance measure has to be informative not only about the agent's effort, but also about his qualification for the new task. Conditions are derived to rank different signals under this requirement.
Copyright (c) 2000 Working Paper Series
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