Supply chain coordination by risk sharing contracts under random production yield and deterministic demand

Autor/innen

  • Karl Inderfurth
  • Josephine Clemens

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.24352/UB.OVGU-2018-468

Schlagworte:

Supply chain coordination, contracts, random yield, risk sharing, emergency procurement

Abstract

From a large body of research studies we know that properly designed contracts can facilitate coordinated decision making of multiple actors in a supply chain (SC) so that efficiency losses for the SC as a whole can be avoided. In a newsvendor-type SC with stochastic demand it is well-known that due to the double marginalization effect a simple wholesale price contract will not achieve coordination. More complex contracts, however, do so, especially those which enable an appropriate sharing of risks between the SC actors. While the effectiveness of risk sharing contracts is well understood for SC situations with random demand and reliable supply, we do not know much about respective SC coordination problems if demand is deterministic, but supply is unreliable due to random production yield.

Veröffentlicht

2018-10-08

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